The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E:  The Effects on Lehman’s U.S. Broker-Dealer by Wiggins, Rosalind Z & Metrick, Andrew
Journal of Financial Crises
Volume 1 | Issue 1
2019
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects





Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Economic History
Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Legal Studies Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and
Evaluation Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Case Studies is brought to you for free and open access by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Financial Crises by an authorized editor of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more
information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wiggins, Rosalind Z. and Metrick, Andrew (2019) "The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E: The Effects on Lehman’s U.S. Broker-




The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E:   
The Effects on Lehman’s U.S. Broker-Dealer1 
 
Rosalind Z. Wiggins2 
Andrew Metrick3 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2014-3e-v1 
October 1, 2014, Revised: July 13, 2015 
Abstract 
Lehman’s U.S. broker-dealer, Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), was excluded from the parent 
company’s bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008, because it was thought that the solvent 
subsidiary might be able to wind down its affairs in a normal fashion. However, the force of 
the parent’s demise proved too strong, and within days, LBI and dozens of Lehman 
subsidiaries around the world were also in liquidation. As a regulated broker-dealer, LBI was 
required to comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission financial-responsibility 
rules for broker-dealers, including maintaining customer assets separately. However, the 
corporate complexity and enterprise integration that characterized the Lehman group 
conflicted with this mandate. Omnibus cash accounts and wide-flung assets complicated the 
liquidation. It became clear in the course of the liquidation that the broker-dealer rules did 
not adequately address these issues or others raised by the infrastructure complexity and 
global reach of the companies to which they applied. This led some observers to question 
whether the rules should be revised and whether the broker-dealer should be excluded from 
all but minimal integration into the holding company’s non-regulated businesses.   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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1.   Introduction  
At the time of its bankruptcy, Lehman Brothers was the fourth largest United States (U.S.) 
investment bank with assets of $639 billion and revenues of $4.4 billion. Although appearing 
outwardly as one integrated company, Lehman was actually a complex network of thousands 
of separate entities. One reason for this structure was to provide containment in the case of 
a rupture in any part of the company. However, once its parent company, Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. (LBHI), began having trouble and then filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 
2008, third parties only saw one Lehman without distinction and aggressively acted to 
protect their interests against any Lehman-related entity.  
Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), Lehman’s U.S. broker-dealer, was excluded from the parent 
company’s bankruptcy because it was thought that the solvent company would be able to 
wind down its affairs in a normal fashion. However, the actions of customers and 
counterparties to avoid Lehman and protect their interests greatly exacerbated LBI’s efforts 
to stay afloat. Moreover, LBHI’s bankruptcy compelled the United Kingdom (U.K.) regulator 
of that time, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), to take Lehman’s U.K. broker-dealer 
subsidiary, Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE), into administration. This meant 
that LBI could not settle billions of dollars in open trades with LBIE. Within days the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) decided that it had no option but to 
liquidate LBI. Its separateness had not protected it.  
As a regulated broker-dealer, LBI had to comply with Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) financial responsibility rules for broker-dealers, which required among other things, 
that it maintain certain capital reserves, segregate customer accounts, and limit its dealings 
with affiliate companies. In addition, the Lehman group was regulated by the SEC under its 
consolidated supervised entity (CSE) program. Yet, Lehman administered many functions on 
an enterprise-wide manner that meant omnibus customer accounts, global cash 
management, and rehypothecation of securities that disbursed them throughout the 
organization and sent them out of the country.   
Although the liquidation of LBI eventually returned 100% of the value of accounts to 
customers,4 the time and difficulty it took to complete raised questions about the 
effectiveness of the system and how well it fit the infrastructure complexity and global reach 
of the companies it governed. This module (1) introduces participants to the complex 
corporate structure maintained by large investment banks such as Lehman and the reasons 
why such structures exist, (2) explores the pros and cons of such a structure, (3) examines 
interconnectedness between Lehman and its U.S. and U.K. broker-dealers as examples of 
how these structures operate and their consequences, and (4) considers what challenges 
complex corporate structures pose for regulators. 
The balance of this case is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the reasons for and 
challenges of a complex corporate structure; Section 3 describes LBI, the Lehman U.S. 
broker-dealer; Section 4 explains how LBI was regulated; Section 5 describes Lehman’s U.K. 
broker-dealer; and Section 6 concludes by discussing the ramifications of Lehman’s 
bankruptcy on its subsidiary broker-dealers.  
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
4 Compare this figure to the estimated 21 cents on the dollar that general unsecured creditors are expected to 
receive from the bankruptcy proceeding (Louis 2011). 
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1. Should the SEC have acted to protect the broker-dealer from its parent’s risky 
actions?  
2. What could it have done?  
3. Should greater separation from the parent be required?  
4. How can regulators better evaluate risks stemming from group interconnections?  
5. Is the current system of broker-dealer liquidation effective given the global reach and 
complexity of today’s organizations? 
2.   Why a Complex Corporate Structure? 
Although they outwardly appear as unified companies, most large multinational businesses, 
such as Lehman, are really multi-tiered networks of entities, collections of corporations, 
limited liability corporations (LLCs), partnerships, and special-purpose entities. By 2008, 
Lehman was a sophisticated global financial enterprise sitting atop a multi-tiered corporate 
structure that comprised 8,000 legal entities in 40 countries. Most customers undertook 
business with the enterprise without knowing exactly with which subsidiary they were 
contracting business. Many did not care, since the regular use of guarantees (by the parent) 
and cross-default provisions often minimized the risk that some small affiliate might fail to 
perform. (See Lehman Brothers 2007 summarizing Lehman’s corporate structure.)  
Limited Liability 
Large multinational corporations structure themselves as corporate webs for a number of 
reasons. One of the most significant reasons is that by separating the business into small legal 
parts, corporations are able to contain exposures and limit liabilities. Inherent in the 
corporate form is its identity as an entity separate from its owners or shareholders. 
Shareholders’ liability to third parties doing business with the corporation is limited to the 
amount of their investment (shareholders’ equity). In theory, a customer doing business 
with Lehman would be limited to seeking redress from the particular company named in its 
agreement and would not have access to the greater assets of the entire group.5 However, as 
noted above, the use of guarantees and cross-default provisions served to neutralize most of 
this limited liability. 
Regulatory Arbitrage 
A second reason influencing corporate structure is that corporations situate businesses 
where they can take the greatest advantage of regulatory and tax schemes. Sometimes 
termed “regulatory arbitrage,” this practice enables businesses to maximize profits while 
minimizing the impact that taxes and regulatory costs have on the business. For example, 
when Lehman was unable to find a U.S. law firm to give a “true sale” opinion regarding its 
Repo 105 transactions, its U.K. subsidiary secured such an opinion from a U.K. firm and 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 While there are exceptions to this rule, when the shareholders are held to have greater liability, this “piercing 
the corporation veil” is a rare occurrence and in practice the use of cross-default provisions and guarantees 
neutralize much of the original limited liability. 
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transferred funds from the U.S. to LBIE, its U.K. broker-dealer, which entered into the 
transactions. (Wiggins, et al. 2014C discusses this issue in detail.)  
Separation for Operational Efficiency 
A third reason that companies organize themselves into various entities is to separate 
regulated businesses from nonregulated businesses. This enables the company to operate a 
smaller footprint within the regulated sphere, while leaving the balance of the business 
unrestrained. This permits containment of any specialized procedures, additional costs, and 
liabilities associated with the regulated business, such as additional employee training or 
specialized screening of transactions with affiliated entities. Such an easily identified 
separation of operations also facilitates regulatory reporting. For example, by establishing 
LBI as a separate company, Lehman was able to better ensure compliance with the SEC’s 
broker-dealer requirements by a containable unit rather than subjecting the entire 
enterprise to these requirements. 
Corporate segmentation also facilitates compliance with rules that differ across jurisdictions. 
For example, by incorporating LBIE in the U.K., Lehman was able to service customers 
located in the U.K. using a U.K. company that followed U.K. securities and customer 
protection rules and which was subject to other U.K. laws.  
3.   The Role of Lehman Brothers Inc. in the Lehman Group 
LBI was a separate, wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of LBHI and a regulated broker-dealer 
registered with the SEC. (See Section 4 for a description of the broker-dealer regulatory 
regime). It was also a member of the New York Stock Exchange, and as such, it was also 
subject to regulation by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.  
LBI was intricately woven into Lehman’s corporate structure. It operated as the principal 
broker-dealer for the entire Lehman group, clearing all U.S. trades (including those 
originating outside the U.S.), and transacted non-U.S. trades originating in the U.S. through 
its Lehman broker-dealer affiliates in other countries. One such entity was LBIE, discussed 
in Section 5 below, which would have a direct and significant impact on LBI’s last days.  
LBI was also party to numerous other intercompany transactions with various Lehman 
affiliates (see Figure 1) and was parent to two subsidiaries that held some of Lehman’s 
riskier businesses: 
Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. (LCPI) was a wholly owned subsidiary of LBI, which 
despite its name, was primarily engaged in buying assets such as residential and 
commercial mortgages, home equity loans, and government and corporate bonds 
from other Lehman affiliates. LCPI would then, through special-purpose vehicles, 
bundle the assets into securitized deals. LCPI was funded through repurchase 
agreements, bank credit facilities and borrowings from LBHI, which were funneled 
through LBI, which in turn funded LCPI (Trustee’s Report, 47-8). 
Lehman Brothers Special Financings Inc. (LBSF) was a wholly owned subsidiary of LBI 
and Lehman’s principal dealer in over-the-counter (OTC) derivative products, 
including interest rates, currency, and credit and mortgage derivatives. LBSF’s wholly 
owned subsidiary, Lehman Brothers Commodity Services Inc., conducted 
commodities trading worldwide in oil, natural gas and other energy markets. It also 
dealt in related financial products, including futures, swaps, options, and structured 
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products. LBSF benefited from a full guarantee from LBHI, and its bankruptcy filing 
was a default under many of LBSF’s outstanding agreements6 (Examiner’s Report, 
Vol. 5, 1618-22; Trustee’s Report, 49-50). 
As Lehman’s situation worsened during the summer 2008, Lehman personnel explored the 
possibility of transferring LCPI and LBSF out from under LBI, but the transactions were 
never executed. (See pages 25-56 of the Trustee’s Report for further description of LBI’s 
businesses and its role within the Lehman organization.)  
 
Figure 1: Lehman’s U.S. Broker-Dealer and Subsidiaries 
 
Note: DE=Delaware; NY=New York 
Source: Lehman Brothers 2007 
 
Coordination for Enterprise Efficiency 
Lehman’s complex corporate structure was designed to create the most regulatory and 
economically efficient corporate infrastructure for the firm as a whole, while limiting risks 
and liabilities. Even though comprised of many entities, companies try to maximize 
efficiencies and minimize costs by operating as one consolidated business and coordinating 
their assets, operations, and personnel, and leveraging their market power. Outwardly, this 
is usually manifested in such mechanisms as corporate enterprise branding, consolidated 
financial reporting, and aggressive cross-selling of products.  
There are also many benefits and attributes of enterprise-wide operations that occur 
internally. Significant support services and infrastructure systems are sourced on a joint 
basis, employing the greater enterprise’s combined scale to an advantage. Lehman operated 
corporate functions, such as finance, risk compliance, legal regulatory, and human resources 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
6 McNamara and Metrick 2014F discusses how such default provisions operate, and Wiggins et al., 2014G 
analyzes how Lehman’s derivatives were discharged as a result of the bankruptcy. 
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on an integrated and consolidated basis. LBI also acted as paymaster and processed accounts 
payable across the group.  
But beyond administrative functions, core operations were also coordinated. As discussed 
below, LBI operated as the primary broker-dealer for the group. This pattern of specialized 
subsidiaries that served a function for the group was common. It was also common practice 
that assets were held by whichever entity was most advantageous. LBI held securities for 
other Lehman entities, and some LBI assets were held by Lehman affiliates, some outside the 
U.S.  
Lehman managed its cash on an enterprise-wide basis; subsidiaries issued cash dividends 
upstream as directed and received capital infusions or loans downstream as needed. 
Lehman’s operations were supported by a global integrated information technology system 
that interfaced and communicated constantly with systems belonging to third parties that 
provided needed services such as clearing services. (LBI’s main agreement for clearing 
services was in fact a three-way agreement between the Lehman parent, LBI, and JPMorgan 
Chase.) When Barclays purchased the substantial part of Lehman’s North America 
operations just days after it declared bankruptcy, it gained control over many of the key 
technology systems and records. Barclays denied access to LBI, other Lehman entities, and 
the SIPA trustee, which caused delay in the processing of outstanding trades and settling of 
the books. The many coordinated collaborations that proved so beneficial and efficient 
during normal operations quickly became liabilities as Lehman’s situation worsened.  
The Downturn in the Summer of 2008 
A significant portion of LBI’s daily repo business by which it funded its operations, was done 
with other Lehman entities (Trustee’s Report, 41-44). LBI operated effectively throughout 
2007 and was solvent and in compliance with regulations governing U.S. broker-dealers as 
of May 31, 2008 (Ibid. 26). However, beginning in the second half of 2008, its parent 
corporation’s troubles began to impact LBI’s operations and particularly the businesses of 
its subsidiaries. Also, its intercompany financing became restricted, creating liquidity 
problems for LBI. “Tangible negative effects on LBI from the crisis in confidence affecting 
Lehman as a whole rendered LBI unable to obtain adequate financing on an unsecured or 
even secured basis, caused the departure of customers, and spurred an increase in failed 
transactions and additional demands for collateral by clearing banks and others” (Ibid.). 
The interconnections between affiliates and the cross-default provisions in many of 
Lehman’s agreements led to a web of transactions that could unravel from one incident of 
failure. As its situation worsened in September 2008, Lehman faced increasing demands for 
additional collateral from its clearing banks. One Lehman executive noted the potential 
“snowball effect” that a bank’s failure to fund LBI’s clearing accounts would have: “then at 
the close of business on Monday [September 15, 2008] LBI will be in default on its overnight 
repo book and security lending by failing to repay. “[I]f default by LBI becomes a default on 
a single material LBHI corporate indebtedness in excess of $100 million, that would cause a 
cascade into the LBSF swaps business, permitting the LBSF swap counterparties to liquidate 
immediately at the end of Monday” (Ibid., 41). 
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4.   Regulation of U.S. Broker-Dealers 
As a registered broker-dealer, LBI was regulated by the SEC and was required to comply with 
numerous regulations, including the Financial Responsibility Rules.7 These rules required 
LBI to maintain (taking into consideration the CSE program discussed below) net capital 
equal at least $500 million with a tentative net capital of at least $1 billion (Ibid., 19-21). 
The rules also addressed segregation and protection of customer funds, books and records, 
and notifications. LBI was required to maintain customer funds separately and to not use 
these for its own account. It also had to maintain fully paid customer property separately 
from its own assets and could not use excess margin for proprietary purposes. If, however, a 
customer purchased securities on margin (i.e., with funds lent to the customer by LBI), LBI 
could repledge those securities to a third party for cash to finance its trading inventory 
positions, settle accounts, or meet customer needs. Identifying and repatriating customer 
securities after the bankruptcies of LBHI and LBIE were particular challenges (Ibid., 57-9). 
LBI was also to maintain written policies and procedures for monitoring and controlling 
financial and operational risks (including risks to its net capital or liquidity) posed by the 
operations, trading positions, and assumed risks of its affiliates, and to make quarterly 
reports to the SEC regarding the same. These rules were designed to provide the SEC with 
advanced warning of any problematic issues facing the broker-dealer so that it could take 
corrective steps. However, LBI’s balance sheet, filed as part of its May 31, 2008, Financial and 
Operational Combined Uniform Single (FOCUS) Report, showed a firm that was on solid 
footing and in compliance with applicable regulations (Ibid., 19-21). (See PwC 2013 for a 
summary of recently updated broker-dealer financial responsibility rules. U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission 2013 provides the full text.)  
 
SEC Regulation of LBI’s Parent 
In 2004, LBHI voluntarily became subject to the SEC’s consolidated supervised entity (CSE) 
program. The CSE program permitted an alternative method for calculating net capital for 
broker-dealers that had adopted risk management practices and were part of a holding 
company structure, provided that the ultimate parent voluntarily submitted to the SEC 
supervision on a group-wide basis.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission regularly met with Lehman to discuss its business 
operations, and after the fire sale of Bear Stearns in March 2008, SEC personnel were 
embedded at Lehman on a continuous basis and regularly received financial data regarding 
its operations. Although the CSE rules empowered the SEC to make additional requirements 
of any supervised entity to avoid or alleviate risk to a regulated entity, the SEC did not 
exercise these powers.8 The Lehman bankruptcy examiner was later highly critical of the 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
7 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2013.  
8 The CSE rules permitted the SEC to impose additional conditions on the broker-dealer or the holding company 
to protect the interests of customers or the public. “These conditions might include, for example: restricting the 
broker’s or dealer’s business on a product-specific, category-specific, or general basis; submitting to the 
Commission a plan to increase the broker’s or dealer’s net capital or tentative net capital; filing more frequent 
reports with the Commission; modifying the broker’s or dealer’s internal risk management control procedures; 
or computing the broker-dealer’s deductions for market and credit risk in accordance with [a statutory 
formula], as appropriate” (Trustee’s Report, 23). 
130
The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy E:  The Effects on Lehman’s U.S. Broker-Dealer Wiggins and Metrick
  
 
agency in the wake of Lehman’s demise. (See Wiggins and Metrick 2014B for further 
description of the CSE regulatory scheme.)  
5.   Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE) 
Lehman Brothers sourced its European businesses from a group of companies incorporated 
in the U.K., which operated as its European regional headquarters. As shown in Figure 2, 
separate U.K. corporations were established for each of Lehman’s three main businesses: 
broker-dealer, investment banking, and asset management. Its European operations were 
conducted through dozens of companies located in, and formed under the jurisdictions of, 
several European countries. In addition, a services company provided support and 
administrative services for the European group as a whole. A U.K. holding company helped 
establish the relationship between the companies and further distanced them from the U.S. 
parent. 
Figure 2: Lehman’s U.K. Group Of Companies 
 
Source: Lehman Brothers 2007. 
 
LBIE was Lehman’s European broker-dealer, whose activities included trading and 
brokering fixed income financial instruments in many major and some emerging markets. 
LBIE was authorized by the FSA and was a member of the London Stock Exchange and also 
of various continental European exchanges. LBIE operated with a full guarantee from LBHI 
and daily received funding from various Lehman entities. It entered into a substantial 
number of repos with LBI, and the companies made intercompany paydowns in cash to each 
other. As LBIE neared FSA administration, it was prohibited from transferring cash out of 
the company; the cash became trapped and unavailable to other Lehman entities.  
LBIE settled almost all the European trades from Lehman entities, including LBI. To support 
this role, LBIE purchased securities on behalf of LBI as local settlement agent and held these 
securities in London. After LBIE was taken into administration by the FSA, several of its 
affiliates, including LBI, made claim to some of these assets, claiming beneficial ownership 
as the true owner. (Trustee’s Report, 56-60). 
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6.   The Ramifications of Lehman’s Troubles  
SIPA Trustee Giddens identified four negative effects on LBI from Lehman’s growing troubles 
that led to the downward spiral of LBI: (1) an inability to obtain financings on an unsecured 
or even secured basis, (2) the departure of clients, (3) an increase in failed transactions, and 
(4) additional demands for collateral by clearing banks and others (Ibid., 26). 
An Inability to Obtain Financing 
LBI assets at May 31, 2008, and August 31, 2008, primarily were made up of reverse repos, 
stock borrow agreements and financial instruments owned. These transactions represented 
94.1% of assets at May 31 and 92.4% at August 31” (Ibid., 28). As shown in Figure 3, during 
the summer of 2008, LBI’s ability to borrow began to decline as third parties demanded 
greater collateral. These challenges at Lehman illustrate the broader “run on repo” that 
drained financing from intermediaries throughout the financial system, as described by 
Gorton and Metrick 2012. During September, its funding sources became even more 
impaired, as third parties began decreasing their exposure to Lehman entities. Its triparty 
repo transactions decreased from approximately $80 billion in May 2008 to less than $650 
million on September 19 (Trustee’s Report, 29). At the same time, the percentage of its 
funding from Lehman affiliates decreased as they struggled to meet their own liquidity 
needs. LBI also experienced an increasing number of failed foreign currency transactions as 
parties refused to return margin, even as LBI continued to perform (Ibid.). 
Figure 3: LBI’s Repos and Stock Borrowings (in US$ millions) 
 5/31/08 8/31/08 9/19/08 
Repurchase agreements – affiliates  63,982  43,427 11,132 
Repurchase agreements – 
nonaffiliates 77,195 100,046 68,980 
Repurchase agreements – total 141,177 143,473 80,112 
Securities loans – affiliates  81,174  61,942 41,032 
Securities loans – nonaffiliates 6,492 6,220 745 
Securities loans – total  87,666  68,162 41,777 
Total repos and securities loans 228,843 211,635 121,889 
Affiliate Percentage 63% 50% 43% 
Source: Trustee’s Report, 29. 
 
The Departure of Clients  
LBI’s records show a rapid departure of hedge fund clients during the summer of 2008. 
Unfortunately, this evidences that these larger (and presumably most sophisticated) clients 
left at a greater rate than others, reflecting the dreary prospects that they saw for Lehman. 
Significant withdrawals by hedge funds reduced LBI’s assets, and in particular, its free 
credits (cash held against liabilities immediately payable to customers) were reduced by 
50%, from $4 billion to $2 billion, during this period. These demands for payment added 
extra strain to LBI’s liquidity challenges. (See Figure 4.) 
132





Figure 4: LBI’s Free Credit Balances (in US$ millions) 
 5/31/08 8/31/08 
Net Payable to Customers 14,478 8,519 
Amount required to be segregated for customer transactions under regulations  
   -Securities Transactions 4,013 4,933 
   -Commodity Transactions  8,603  7,546 
Free Credits in Customer Accounts  3,978  2,014 
Source: Trustee’s Report, 31 (Footnotes omitted). 
 
An Increase in Failed Transactions  
During the first weeks of September 2008, the FSA closely monitored the reports regarding 
Lehman’s situation—its efforts to find a purchaser or major investor, the third quarter loss 
of $3.9 billion, and that it would spin off its commercial real estate assets. Lehman's shares 
continued to drop and, by the close of business on September 10, Moody’s Investors Service 
announced that it would downgrade Lehman on Monday, September 15, if a purchaser had 
not been found. 
In light of these developments and in acknowledgement that LBHI managed centrally 
substantially all of the material cash resources of the Lehman group, the FSA sought 
guarantees that LBIE would be funded on Monday, September 15. LBHI's failure to fund or 
settle obligations on behalf of LBIE at any time would render LBIE insolvent. When such 
assurances were not forthcoming and when it looked like LBHI would be filing for 
bankruptcy, FSA made plans to take LBIE and the other Lehman U.K. companies into 
administration, leading to an immediate freezing of their assets on September 15.  
In the U.S., however, LBI continued to operate, and its customers continued to enter into U.K. 
and European trades, which normally would have been processed by LBIE. Instead, many 
such trades became trapped in Lehman’s IT systems, which were suddenly shut off from LBI 
as each entity isolated itself and third parties ceased providing access. By September 19, 
there were “over 95,000 ‘failed to receive from LBI’ trades across approximately 4,600 
unique securities, and an additional 105,000 ‘failed to deliver to LBI’ trades across 5,200 
unique securities.” The vast majority of these showed activity after September 12 (Trustee’s 
Report, 38). 
Additional Demands for Collateral by Clearing Banks and Others 
During the summer of 2008, LBI’s key clearing banks, and in particular, JPMorgan, its 
principal clearing bank, made a number of demands for increased collateral under threat 
that it would stop clearing trades. As illustrated below in discussing the JPMorgan 
relationship, the frequency and size of these demands greatly strained LBI’s cash and 
liquidity. Similar protective actions by parties in the U.K. relating to LBIE once it was taken 
into administration also impacted LBI positions and collateral that were held through LBIE.  
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As Lehman’s principal clearing bank, JPMorgan sometimes advanced Lehman up to $100 
billion a day. Between July and September 2008, JP Morgan’s demands for additional 
collateral totaled $17 billion in cash and securities. On September 9, it requested an 
additional $5 billion in collateral from Lehman, which Lehman was unable to raise, providing 
only an additional $3 billion. On September 12, JPMorgan again requested an additional $5 
billion in collateral. Scrambling to locate unencumbered assets across the organization, 
Lehman’s treasury requisitioned $2.7 billion of cash from LBI, a significant reduction in LBI's 
operating cash, which it delivered to JPMorgan, along with an additional $2.3 billion pulled 
from other Lehman affiliates (Ibid., 34-36). 
In late August 2008, JP Morgan secured favorable amendments to its main Lehman clearance 
agreement and also entered into a new security agreement and guaranty agreement, which 
sought to net JP Morgan’s liability to all Lehman entities to which it provided clearance 
advances through LBI, providing JP Morgan liens against the assets of these other entities. A 
September 9 amendment to the security agreement extended JP Morgan's security interest 
in LBI’s property so that its lien secured any indebtedness that LBI had to JP Morgan, not just 
indebtedness relating to the clearance activity (Ibid.). (See pages 25-39 of the Trustee’s 
Report detailing these impacts on LBI. Also see pages 60-74 for discussion of the technical 
difficulties accompanying these issues.)  
Lack of Planning 
Many of the issues that the trustee highlighted were a result not only of Lehman’s integrated 
corporate structure, but also of the fact that there was no roadmap of that structure and that 
advance planning regarding the bankruptcy had not been done. This led to confusion about 
the ownership of certain assets and also to an inability to access customer records and 
critical technologies within days of the filing because of the sale of portions of the business 
to Barclays and several other governmental actions, such as the FSA takeover of LBIE. Bryan 
Marsal, co-chief executive officer of Alvarez & Marsal, who administered the Lehman 
bankruptcy estate, said that the bankruptcy was “an unconscionable waste of value” and that 
“an orderly plan to wind down Lehman should have been pursued” (Louis 2011). 
Title I of The Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) 
requires that significantly important financial institutions, such as Lehman, prepare a 
detailed plan identifying key resources and policies (a living will) so that any bankruptcy or 
winding down could be conducted in an orderly fashion. Title II of Dodd-Frank granted new 
powers to the FDIC, empowering it to conduct an orderly liquidation of a financial institution 
in order to avoid or minimize some of the negative effects and costs that occurred in the 
Lehman collapse. In April 2011, the FDIC issued a report, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman 
Brothers Holdings Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, in which it makes the case that it would 
have been able to dismantle the company in a much more orderly fashion and at little cost to 
the taxpayers if the new laws had been in effect in 2008. While the FDIC’s optimism has been 
disputed (see for example Louis 2011 and Sprayregen and Hessler 2011), one must consider 
whether an outcome under Dodd-Frank would be preferable to a Lehman-type bankruptcy.  
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